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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
WfLLL\M .T. COLMAN,

Pl11intijf 1111d LlJJ]Jrlla1il,
\'S.

C. ANDERSON, an cl
R. ANDERSON, his wifr,

Civil No. 12712

!Jef'e11dant and Respo11de11t.

l.

N'rA'l.111Jl\lEN'l 1 OF TJHJ NATURE OF THE
Tn tlw first canse of action Colman and Ander-

having pevionsl>· sut•d Hackett ( nsing the same attorne>·) for eonversion of penny stock, and Colman having
r1•eovert>d $14,000.00 in said action, Colman ( nsing the
,;arne attorne)·) now snes And<>rson in conversion for
(']aimed additional damages on exactly the i:>arne facts;
also, in the S(•c<md Cause of Action, Colman sues Ander,;on in a claim<>d cause of action arising out of a loan
:-;011,

for $2, l 00.00 from Colman to Anderson, but Colman ad-

lllitted at the trial that he had received repayment in the

anionnt of $2,900.00.

2. DISPOSITION IN 'FHE LOvVER COURT. The
II 0J1orahle Marcellns K. Snow, sitting without a jnry,
iiPanl tli<• (•as<' at a trial on tli<• merits and rnled in favor
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of defc.ndants, (Anderson), and against plaintiff (Co!rnnn), no cause of action.
3. RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL. Respondent
s(•elrn an affirmance of the Lo\\·e Court's decision.
4. STATEl\lENT ()]!-, FACTS. R<.>spondent disagrees with appdlants characterization of the facts primarily hecausP tlw appellant's characterization ignore:s
the point that all relevant facts were disputed and the
Court
tl1e dispnte in favor of the respondent and
the app0llant only refers to that testimony which is favorahle to his position and fails to address the issue as to
whetlwr or not tlwre was competent, relevant evidencP
upon \\·hieh tlu• Court eould haw based its decision.
On N ovemLer 1967, Respondent borrowed $1,100.00
J'rorn plaintiff whieh amount was (klivl'red to him in the
form of a <·heck draftNl upon Owanalt Oil Corporation,
a Colorado Corporation, aecoHnt. ( R 153, 154 and gxhibit
18-p).

On NoverntH'r

H>G7, Respondent borrowed

$1,000.00 from plaintiff whieh amount was delivt:>red to

l1im in the form of a check drawn on Owanah Oil Corporation, a Colorado Corporation, account. (R 124 and Exhibit 17-p). No

hack tim<· was specifo:·d. rrhe pay

hack was tied to an event which was the securing by
Anderson of an additional loan to finance a huilding
project in .Jaekson Hol(•,

ont of whieh loan

3
proceeds the loans would be repaid to Colman. A Quit
Claim Deed was given as 8ecurity for the foregoing loans
and for no other purpose (R 9G, 154, 158, 159).
On D<-"cemlwr 22, 1967, Mr. Colman loaned Mr. AndPrson 10,000 shares of Kennebec stork for an indefinite
1wriod of time. The pay back of which was tied to an
<•\'ent, that of Mr. Anderson securing an additional loan
(H 159).
\Vith Mr. Colman's permission and knowledge and
approval, Anderson first pledged the stock for a loan
at Miller Finance Company and subse<1uently pledged the
stock to 0. L. Hackett to secure a loan from him, the
proceeds of which were used to pay off the Miller Finance
Company loan (R 160 through 164).
In .June of 1969, Colman wanted to get the stock back
and instrnctt>d Anderson to tender payment to Hackett.
Amh•rson used his lwst pfforts to contact Hackett and
pay the balance due on the loan prior to the due date
tlrnrpof. (R 169 through 170). Hackett sold the stock
prior to thP due date of the loan, and without notice to
(;o]man and Anderson (R 170, 171). Subsequently, Colman and Andt>rson \Vent to Attorney Frank Allen, who
instituted suit in the name of DevVayne C. Anderson
against 0. L. Hackett and Company although he was
l'<'J>l'PS<•nting \Villiam Colman (R 170 through 175 and
H
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As a result of that law suit Colman received $14,-

000.00 (R 112, 113).
Colman then, using F1'ank Allen, the same attorney
who had represented Anderson against Hackett, sned
Anderson in the present action (R 1through3).
Anderson paid Colman $2,900.00 to pay off the loan
sued for in the Second Cause of Action (R 174).
5.

ARGUl\l J1JNT.

I

I.

THE DEFBNDANT DID N0'11 CONVERT
STOCK OF 'THE PLAIN11 H-,F.

The Conrt in Findngs of

nmnrwr 5, providt>d

as follows:

"5. rrhe parties
agret•d duringMay or June of 19GS, that the stock could he
pledged to one Gt>orge Hackett for a new loan
upon terms agTPeahle to the parties."
Appellant
that hecamw starnlar<l loan documents wen•
in tl1is regard, a conversion to
Hackett occ1m'd at tltt> date of tlw dPliwr>· of tlw stock
to H aekc,tt prtrsmmt to
stock po\\-('l' sig·n<>d hy Anderson.

rL1 hP t·vidence in the rc>cord was ample to support the
finding that Colman knew the terms of the agreement
pnrsuant to which the stock was delivered to Hackett
and approvt>d of the same prior to the delivery of the
stock and that Hackett knew of Colman's ownership (R

n 191 ).

A pararnonnt consideration in this regard is the fact
that the stock delivered to Hackett was street stock, and
tlwreforr, it was not necessary for Hackett to sign off
the stock prior to s<>lling the same. One can only ask
what steps could have been taken in order to prevent
Hackett from having that ability. rrlw ans,vers seems to
lw that Anderson conld not have taken any steps but
rather, th1· only step which conld have lwen taken would
have h<'en for Colrnan to have had the street stock transJ'ened into his own name and then deliver the certificate
to Racket. Since Colman agreed to the delivery to
Hackett in the form of strrf't stock, it can only be prethat Colman decided that it was not appropriate
or neeessary to transfer the same into his name prior to
the delivery. rrlw document which Anderson signed at
tlw tilne ht• delivered the street stock to Hackett in no
'my affrcted HackPtt's abilit.\· to sell the stock over the

<'x.ehang-c• since it "·as stre<>t stock and only delivery thereof' was rn'rPssary in ordrr to effectuate the brokerage

1ransadion. rriw position tahn hy AppelJant in his brief
ig-norPs all tlw statt'lllPnts in tlw rPrord faYorahle to
Amlt•rson ;-;!towing tliat Colman k1ww of tlw terms of

{)

the Haekett loan and approved of them. Among other
testimony that was elicited in this regard, 11 r. \Varnock,
counsel for tlw plaintiff, himself elicited the following
information fonnd at page 18:-3 of the record:

"Q.

(By Mr. \i\Tarnock) \i\Then did you first tell
Mr. Colman that tlw stock had been pledg(•d
as collateral with l\Ir. Hackett?

A.

(By Mr. Anderson) I told him prior to "·hen
l did it that I was going to try to do it. An<l
f told him aftPr it was doll('."

At pagPs 181and182 in the record, 1\fr. Warnock <•licited
the following information from l\f r. Anderson:

"Q.

Well, you just said it was due on .May 2nd."
(Refering to tlw MillPr
Company
loan).

"A.

'rlie Pxtt•nsion of that not<> was drn· on .May
:2nd, .•:(•S.

Q.

All right. Did yon ha\·e a conv(•n;ation with
Colman at any ti111<• during tlie
part
of ::\fa rel1?

A.

YPs. Jam

Slll"\'

r did.

AJl(l what was that eonv(•rsat ion: wlwn a]l(I
\\·l1<·n· did that <·om·<·r:-:ation tak<· pla<•(•'/
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A.

I would

T am snn·.

in his office. In his office,

Q.

And what was the snhstance of that conversation?

A.

1 1hat th(' notP was eoming d1w.

Q.

And what did Mr. Colman say'?

.A.

He said, 'Oet it renPwed if you can,' and I did.

(!. After that, wlwn did you have a discussion
with 1\fr. Colman relativP to the Miller note?

A.

A ft pr tfw Milin notP lwearne <lne in l\fay.

Q.

And 'dH·n did that ronversation take place?

Tn l1is offiet•.

A.

1\f r. Colman and mys<•lf.

Q.

And "·hat did yon
tirn<''?

.\.

I said tlw not<> is <l11P again.

Q.

Arnl what did h<• say!

to Mr. Colman at that

8
A.

He said, 'you've got to get money to pay it.

Q.

And what did yon say to that Mr. Anderson?

A.

I said, 'I am negotiating for a loan,' and I
told Mr. Miller this also.

Q.

What did Mr. Colman say to that?

A.

He just said we had to get something to safo;fy that note."

At page 1fi3 of the rPrord, the follo-wing testimony is
found:

"Q.

(By Mr. Summerhays) And what did Mr.
Colman say ahout the Hackett loan possihility?

A.

He said that he was all in favor if we coulJ
get a loan, or if I conld get a loan, from
Haekett. IT<> wanted lllP to get a loa11.

Q.

\Yas there any discussion ahout the possihlc
pledging of the Kennelwc stork on the Hackett

Q.

And what was said ahout that?

A.

I told Bill that the only way that Hackett had
agreed, that he would pay off 1\filler and then
dednct it from the amount of the $30,000.00.

Q.

Did you have another discussion with Mr.
Colman 1n
in the 0arly part of .June,

Q.

·what was said, when and
that, exrns0 nw, wherP did that

.;\.

At, oh, ah011t the 10th, 8th or 10th of Jnne.

Q.

And wherP did it

.\.

In his offieP.

Q.

\Vho wa:- pres0nt'?''

When did

\ .. 011tim1inp; on paµ;<· lli-l- ol' tl1<' rerord)
".\.

11<'1\'HS.

Q.

On that occasion, did >"OU agam discuss the

Q.

\Vhat was the 8tatus of the Racket loan 1
yon able to rlose a $30,000.00 loan at
t Ii n t ti 1.110 or was t lw n' some othPr possihility 7

Harhtt ]nan pMsilJility?
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A.

No. At that time, he was holding up. I said
that he didn't know quite whether he would
do it, make the loan or not, or pay off Miller
at the time.

Q.

Did you tell Mr. Colman that?

A.

Yes.

Q.

And what did Mr. Colman say on that occasion?

A.

HP said, 'you will have to raise the money

from somewhere to pay off Miller loan.'

Q. Did you tell him it was still a possibility to
get the money from Hackett?

A.

Yes. Mr. Hacket thPn carnP hack. I told him
that there was a chance Mr. Hackett would
pay off the note.

Q.

And did 1\fr. Colman agree that that would be
all right?

A.

YPs.

Q. ·what did he sa:-< in that regard!!
A.

He said that you had to gd the 1110n<')' someplace, and that was the hest placP, if l ·was
going to complete tlw loan with Mr. HackPtt,
to dPdnet it from it.

11
Q.

Was then· a dissussion about what would happen to the Kenndwc stock if Miller were paid
off?

l\.

ft \rnuld have to he plt>dged as collateral to
).Jr. Hackett.

Q.

Did you mention that fact to Mr. Colman on
that (continuing on page l6G of the record)
<weasion in early .Jmie?

'f'ltt·refon·, WP see that thP record clearly supports
tl1r finding that there was not a conversion by the deliver:' of th<> stoek to Hackett, but rather that it was done
llllrswrnt to ugTt>ernent bPhV<'f'n Colman and Anderson
i l1at s11(']1 d<>livPr:· shonl<l lw rnaclP.
In ordt'r to understand the nature of the obligation
frorn A rnkrson to Colman and to determine whether or
11ot then· was a ('011versiol! as alleged hy Colman we need
to d<'lPrwine thP legal n•lation::;hip between Colman and
_\11d<•1·son at th<• fonP Andt>rson delivc>red thf' stock to
11 aeb•tt.

'l 1 lt<• ( '011rt found tlrnt a haihuf'nt c>xist<•d.

i11

:\ linilwent is <lPfirn•d in .S Am .Jur 2nd at pagP 90G,
'.!of Baihn<>nts as follows:
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"A bailment in its ordinary legal signification
imports the delivery of personal property by one
person too another, in trust, for a specific purpose
with a contract, expressed or implied, that thl'
trust shall be faithfully executed, and the lHopt>rt.'·
returned or duly accounted for when the special
purpose is accomplished, or kept until the hailor
reclaims it."
It is asst>rted that this arrangement was clearly a
bailment contract by tlw very terms of the plaintiff'1-;
complaint and pursuant to the te:stimony elicited by tlw
plaintiff in his ease in chief. The stock certificate was
deliYerecl from tlw plaintiff-hailor to the defendant, DP\Vaynt> C. Anderson as Bailee, with the understanding
that pnnmant to the arrangement, the stock certificate
wonld be returned. Assuming, tlwn, that this is a bail11H•nt, the 4m•stion arises as to what type of a haihnent
it was. In 8 Am J ur 2nd, Baihut•nts, Section G, page 911,
tl1P following is found:

'''rile dutiPs and tlw liahilities of hailor and
hail.Pe gt>nerall.'·
ac('ording to thC'
charaetPr of the haihnent as one for mutual lwnefit
or gratuitous; tlH· foundation principal is tlw
thought that upon him
labors or pains al'('
to go 1mrPquit<>d should rt>st most lightly tlw obligations of can•. [n aeconlane<• with this prineipal.
an' now gc•nprall.'· elas:::;ifi<'d nnd<>r thn·P
!wads: ( 1)
for th<'
henP!'it of' the hailor;
(:2) t11m:p for th<' soPI ht'nPl'it of th<' hail<•(': and (:n
l'or tlw ltllltnal lH•1wfit of hoth

1t js conceded by the ddendant that this was a bail1m•nt for the sole lwnefit of the bailee and the duties of
defined 1rithin this SCO})P. rrhis brings llS
to the question of the rc->spective responsibilities and obligations of the hailee under this type of relationship.
t]I\'

hail(•(•

lll'(•

;\µ;ain, in 8 Am Jur 2nd, Railrnents, Section 200, page
tlw following is found:

"It is the general rule that unless made so by
statute or by express contract, an ordinary bailee,
no matter to what class he belongs, is not an irisnrPr of the safety of goods delivered into his
keeping. 'l1here are a fow special kinds of bailees,.
snch as common caniers and inn keepers, upon
w11om tlw la\\" on grounds of public policy, impo:-:es a strict rult> of liability for the safety of
g·oods intrnsted to their eare, but unless the bailee
is of snch rlass or kind, lw is liable only for loss
J'(':-:ulting from his negligencp in care for and protPcting the property hailed, unless
hailment
C'Ontrad hf' hns assmned a gTPat(•s Jiahilit:-·."
"\t

:201, paµ,'·

in thP same work,

t It!' l'ollowinµ: is Jlro\"idi•<l:
''Acts for which bailee not liahk Unless a
haile<' has yiolated ltis contract he will not be
liahl(•, in tlw ahsenee of 1wgligenct', for loss or in-

.illr.\· in n•spc'ct to the thing hajled, resulting from
tl1<> inltPn'nt natme of tliP JH'opert_\' itself or some
infirrnitv thrrPof, from
or accidental
<'a:rnnlt_\:, or from rnll1wry, lrnrglary, or theft. Nor
is lie liahlP for los:' of tl1P propert.\· hPc>ause of

14
process of law directed against his bailor, confiscation or taking by superor force, the act or negligence of a third person (emphasis added), or the
negligence or contributory negligence of the bailor,
his sf'rvants, or agents."
The plaintiff, William Colman has already brought
an action against George Hackett alleging that the said
Georgf' Hackett wrongfully convt>rted the stock certifieate
with fraudulent intent. The plaintiff maintains the rather
unique if not hizzare position that Anderson first conVt>rh•d the cPrtifieate from Colman by delivering it to
Hackt>tt and then Hackett converted it from Anderson
wrongfully, all of which plaintiff claims gave 11im two
cansPs of action, one agaim;t Hackett in which he

l'C'-

eovered the $14,000.00, and now one against AndPrson for
which he should recover an additional $65,177.00. All of
the foregoing and the evidPneP in the record supporb,;
thP finding by tlw Conrt that the conversion by Hackett
\nu; an independent wrongful ad

Hackett wl1ich was

the sole proximate <·muw of the loss h>· Coh11:m. Thi:::
finding and eonclm;ion was Pntirely eon:,.:istent with thP
finding that tlwre was no eonnrsion hy Anderson hut
that rath1:1r Anderson was aeting within
liail111Pnt arrang<'lll<'nt with Colman.

tl1P

seopP of l1i:--

'J1he defendant, De\Vayne C. Anderson, maintains the
position that the Supreme Court should accept the trial
<'Onrt's findings as to which of the conflicting evidence
\\as thf' truth. 1-lo\\"('Ver, even if the court were to overt urn the findings of the lower conrt and accept the plaintiffs view of the evidence and rule agaim;t the defendant,
DP\Va.nw C. Anderson, then De\Vayne C. Anderson
would maintain tlw position that the only liability which
<"onl<l he imposed upon him would be for a nominal conn rsion as a joint tort feasor with George L. Haekett.
I loweyer, the plaintiff, \Villiarn Colman, has released
UeorgP L. HackPtt and plaintiff and executed a release
\\'hen h(· n•c(•iYed thP $14,000.00 settl(•nwnt. 'l111e plaintiff
11·ould lw bound in this regard h.'· thP Horn-Book law set
t"orth ai -!;) Am .J m, Relemw, 8Petions :1:3 and :35.
'''l1he great majority of the courts hold that

a release of one of several joint ohligors on a
contraet rehJases all."

"A release, under seal of one joint tort f easor,
n' h·asf's all. 'l1li is rult> has lwen extended to un:-;paJed n·h·ases, upon tlu• theory that the essential
unity of the
arnl the fad that the injured
party is Pntitlt'd to hut one compBnsation, therefore, mah it irnpossihle for the inj11rt>d JWrson to
st'ttlP with mw joint tort f Pasor without discharging t11P ntlwr.''
posdioll has li<'('B adopted as a matter of routine
tlH'
of Utah and th<> plaintiff, therefore,
will h.· liatTPd in an.'· Pvent from prosecuting against the

1G

defendant, Anderson, particularly in virw of the manner
in which he has proceeded in the retention of conm;el.
Another question raised by Colman in this section of
his brief is raised for the first time on appeal, that is thL·
question as to whether or not Anderson was unjustly
enriched by an
cancellation of the Hackett loan
in the Anderson and Colman vs. Hackett suit. That
(1nestion is 'not raised in the complaint nor in any of tlw
subsequent pleadings, and it was not placed in issue
at the trial, although testimony was presented with n·spect to it. 'rhPn'fore, the plaintiff cannot
this
iss1w nm\' on appeal.
HowevPr, Pven if hls question had heen properly
]Jlaced in issne hy framing it in the pleadings, either
prior to or during the trial, the <'Olll't was still ;j11stifi<·11
in rnling against th(' plaintiff' on this isSl!P as a q1wstion
of fact. r1 1lw plaintiff's position i,-.; that tliP m11011nt for

which Haekt>tt sold tlw stock at tliu ti11H• lie· eonvurtc•d it
\\-as pnrportecll:· n·dt1ee<l hy the arnotmt of th<' Iom1 du·
to Had::<>tt from And<->rso11 nt t11(' tirn<> tlH' s<•ttl<'llll·nt \ras
in t1• is n·-

rnadP. IIowvvc·r, the h'stimo11y ic-;
g·anl. Alt110ngh im;tant

for tlH· ddvnclant :-da(l'<l

in thP op<'11ing :-;tat<·m<'llt that then· wa:-; .·:u<'li a d 1 '(ludio11
from the arnmmt Colmm1 n'cPiV<'d froin I
t1w Joan ammmt d1w from

a rni:>td:.<' by

to l luckdt,

for

11·as

aiHl Frank Allf·n. UH· attonwy !'or
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Colman who testified at the tJ'i.al and who stated that he
was biasPd in favor of Colman made the following statelltt•nt at page 120 in the rf'cord, linf's 3 through (i:
''A.

Mr. Colman and l\Ir. Anderson came into my
office. I said, 'De 'V ayrn•, we haw· an offer of
sPttlPment from Mr. Hackett. lfo is offering
to giw us all tlw money that ht> received from
the sale of tlw stock when he sold it, less
1i.ttonH•y's frP.'"

Allen later testifit•d that Colman and Anderson ac(•eptP<l this sPtth•111t>n t off er. TherPfore, Wt' see that the
dPdnrtion from fop amount for which Hackett sold the

st<>l'k was not a dt>duction for .AndPrson's loan but was
a d"du<'tion for 1-Jaekett's
feps which he paid
tll his eo,msPI in dd't,11ding him ap;ainst Colman and
c\ndPrson's suit. Th<· n·sulting nt>t settlement was for the
:-:(•t tl<'11wnt or a di:;;;pnte<l claim and must stand as it was

rPndPn•<l. 'l 1 ltPre was no tPstirnony actually in the r<>cord
lo 1111• d'frd that the .Andt>rsou loan from Hackett was
P\.t i11g11i:-:l1P<l

h

hy n11:· <k<ludion made from arnonnts due>

( 'oliwrn or

lla<'b•tL

Ji:·

aH:· arnounts paid to Colman from
thPre is no evidence in thP rf'cord

l'i>Oll

\\'lti('h plaintiff rnn now elairn an unjust enrich-

1:J1'11t

h:; And(•r:,:on. 'l1 he suit against HackPtt by Colman

:!

t1d .\;1d('r:-:on ',ms f'or $7:2,000.00 and the faet that tlH•
mi:-; a nd $14,000.00 cannot, aftpr the fad,

lH· ti<•d to

(II<'

loan arnotmt.
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The entire pleadings in this case were framed around
the question as to the amount of damages which plaintiff
should receive as a result of an alleged conversion of
stock by the defendant.
Therefore, in summary we :see that an accord and
satisfaction was reached between the three parties, Colman, Anderson and Hackett, at the time the Hackett law
snit was resolved. The rationale behind the rule that the
release of one joint tort feasor i:s the rPlease of all is to
prevent a multiplicity of law suits, circuity of actions arnl

to prevent an unjust resnlt to the defendants in joint
tort f Pasor ra:-;Ps.

'rhe plaintiff, however, elaims that tlwre was an
agTePment verbally to the eff<>ct that Colman wonld lw
mad<> whole by Ander::;on. '1 1lw l'Pspondcnt n·spectfnll.\·
disagref•s '\\'ith the following quotation from appellant':-'
l>l'iPf:
"The evidence is undisputed that Anderson
told Colman in the presence of Frank Allen that
he, Anderson, \Yould rnake things right to Cohnai1,
this af tpr tlw :-;ettlcrnent with H H<'k<'tt."
Th(• eYid<'ne<· uduali;.· found in t11e>

is clirPet 1;.·

to th<' eontrar;.·. At pagP 129 of tlH· reeonl, th(• followi11g·

quot<> is l'oun<l frn111 F'nrnk Allf•n\; tr•stimony:

"There was no agreement of settlement because they had not reached an agreement of settlement."
Here Attorney Allen was referring to whether or not
Anderson
then• was an agreement of settlement
and Colman at the time they effectuated the settlement
with Harhtt. rrhis clearly belies the fact that there was
an
as to \vhat Anderson would pay Colman.
'!'his is supported by Anderson's testimony, found at
pagPs 17() and 177 of the record:

"Q.

(By Mr. Summerhays) Did you tell Mr. Colman that you owed him anything else?

A.

Yes.

Q.

"What

A.

I told him I would try to make it right with
him and that I would, I had a mining deal
that I would try to put together that would
fit one of his companies. And I went up to
Idaho and spent considerable time and considerable mmwy trying to put it together so
he could
to make him, try to make him
whole from the transartion.

Q.

How murh money did you spend on thaH

A.

Between two and four thousand dollars.

Q.

Whatc•yer hap1wn('d to

"\VHS

that?

(foal?
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A.

Mr. Colman sent his geologist up out of his
office, and who liked it very W(•ll, but Colman
never did anything with it.

Q.

Did you, at any time, say that you ,,·ere going
to pay the difference hehn•0n what Hackett
settled for and the high market valiw of th<'
stock?

A.

No."

ITT.

DAMAGES SHOFLD BE TAKEN AS Olj'

'l1HE DA 'l'E OF rl'FHJ

ProhalJly the single most imvortant aspect of tlw
(•ase with r(•spect to damages was defendant's exhibit 21d. The date of defendant's Exhbit 21-d is .Jnne 5, 19GS.
rrlw alleged conversion according to the complaint ocemecl on J annary 2, 19()8. ThP iJJaintiff nm\- makes argulll<'nt in his hrief to the pffeet that tlw conwrsion occm1Td on
12, 19()3. rr'lw Exhiliit 21-d, hearing tJw date•
of .T mw 5, 1
is au agr<'ernent
\Villiam Colman
sold 2500 sl1ai·es of :-:toek at 20
p<•r slian• and µ:aw
tlt<' hny<>n; tl1<· option to irnreJ1as<> an additional 147/:iOO
slial'PS of stoek: at :20 c<:•nts ]Wl' share. rrl1P folim1·i11g ln11g"ll<lg'<' is takPn from that (loe1nrwnt:
"5.

d(WS hereh.Y grant to p11rdmsn (]!('
<l}Jtion to Jll11'ehm.;<· th<' rE>rnaining 147,500 sL:.n<>:-:
of tlt<· eapital stoek O\nwd h:-' 11irn in
e0111pnn.'
ai ih· rat<• of 20 <'nits [l<'l'
upon tit<> folio\\ ing
nli<l C'omlii ions:
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''(a) rrhat on 01' before the 5th day of July,
lDGS, purchas(,1' will ]mrchase and pa>· for not less
than 15,000 shares of the remaining share8 owned
the RPllrr nt 20 ('('nts ]Wl' 8hare;
"(h) After August 1, 19(}8, and on or before
and not later tltan the 5th da>' ol' .Jurn•, 1970, P11rt·liasPr agrees to pnrehase and pay for any remaining shares cnrnecl
RellPr."

The stock which was the subject matter of that transadion was K<'nnPlwc ::;tock which is exactly the same stock
which is the s11bjeet matter of this case. In that agreement Colman was selling Kennebec stock at 20 cents per
sltan, and giving an option for the sale of Kennebec stock
whiel1 would lw exercisable through Jnne 5, 1970, at 20
1·<·11ts

per share. Now the plaintiff claims that l1e is en-

titll'd to n•ceiw $7.25 iwr share, which was the value of
tliP stock on .Tnne 26, 1969, althongh the alk gecl conver1

sion oecnrred, according to Colman, o,·er a year prior to

that datP, and when he liad at the time of the alleged con\'<•rsion sold the saint> stock at

:.m cents per

share. All of

this in tl1<> face of the l'Pcowry \\·hich he has pn•viously
madt• i11 tll<' amount of $1.40 per share.
Jn tlte <•n11t the defondant failed to comply with his

to return th<·
('il:'<'

to the plaintiff, then tlw Utah

of 09de11
prnlmtivt>, th<' Comt said:

of Coo111f;s a11d Company

I O!J7,

i·s. Reed, 303
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''The measure of damages for failure to dPliver stock in breach of contract of sale in an available market, is the difference in contract price arnl
market price at time of refusal to deliver even
though the buyer has contracted with third 1wrsons for resale at a specified priC(', -which may h(•
less than the
price at tinH' of refusal of
seller to deliver."
rrliP Con rt stated at paµ;es 1007 and 1098 as follows:

'·'l111e question raitwd h.v this appt·al, tlwn, is:
'DoPs the measure of damagPs for a s0llers rdusal
to d0liver stock in hrt>ach of a contrnct to t-iell at a
t·ertain priee consist of the difftT\'llCe in contract
price and market price at the timt> of refnsal to
deliver, when the buyer intendf'd to resale at a
profit?' Uh:h Code Annotated 1953, G0-5-5(3)
reads as follows: ' ( 3) -where there is an a vailabk
market for tlH' goods in question, tlw measure of
damages, in the absence of a S]H-'t·;al eiremnstai1<·<·
sl1owing approxirnatP da111ages of a greatt>r
amount, is the ditlnenee lwhn'Pn
contract
pric<· and the market or <'lllT<'nt 1ll"iees of goods
at a time or timp;; wlH'll tlw.'- onght to
h('<'ll
dr•livered, or, if no time was fixed, then at t11e
tim<• of the rPf\isal to (klivl'r.' \VP 1-i<'(' 110 valid
n'ason 1YhY t}w ;;frtnl<' ;:l10l'1<l 11ot 1H• interprd<'<1
to tl1<• natnrti.1 11waning of its
plin1.+olog·\-. Tf we W<'l"<' to allow <hrnage;-; i11 111"
form of profit lost h.': th'.· 1lu>er'.-.:
11ric('.
orip:in:1l H'Hn eo111<l gantl:le ,,·iil1 tli<' i11arkd.
!fr 1\·n11kl lH' in a lJO>'ition to J'<'l»Hlint<' 11i:.; <'Ontnw1,
j!r1.\' tl1<·
lm;t profitc.: n.•: <1nua '.,"<'--.:, mHl 1T,:1·ll
t]w ,:\o<"k in n >i.'.:·l:< r n1a!'l:d n1 <: gT(><l1<>J' prnfi1:
1

or, in the event tlie market fell, he rould choose
to deli v<·r tliP stock at tlw original contract price
and n·ap his original profit. Tht lef);islature in tlw
<'nactment of tlw above Seeiton made a prononneernent against snelt sp0c11lation."
'I'll<· smilP theory is supported in
nrtidP
the measure of
Ill' s(o<'k, \d1irh stat<·s at pag<•

;n .ALH

3rd in an
for com·Prsion

"At common law the measure of damages
de1wnds to a large extent on the form of action.
'L'l111s, as not<•d in Section 5(a) infra, the measurP
of damages for eorn·ersion is normally the market
valrn• of the property at the time of conversion.
On the other hand, the measure of damages for
hrPaeh of contract is compensatory, that is, the net
amount of the loss cawwd and gain prevented
h.Y the hreach. In ass1ml] >sit, damages were conf irwd to tlw amount artnally
by the defrndant for tlw propNty. And in replevin, damagPs \\'Pre normally the yn]ue of the iiroperty at the
t irnP of taking, although an occasional case award<·<l vahw at tl1P tirne of trial.
sornP cases have stated that the rneastm· ol' dmnag<:>s should he the same regardless of
tlw form of artion, connsel seeking recover:-, for
stoek Of' fludnnting val UP IYiJl Jw IYise to consider
"hdher lte may not rvcover nndrr a more favoralil<' rneaslll'P of dnrnaµ-<'s hy framing his action
as mw for hn•ach of trust, r<>plevin, breach of cont rnd, or specific ,neiforn11u1ce." (Emphasis added)

24
In the instant action, the plaintiff, '\Villiam Colman,
sought to recover in conven;ion from George Hackett
which nterposed a long period of delay prior to the commencement of this action against the defendant, Dewayne C. Anderson. In the previous action, and in this
action, rather than to seek specific performance to receive back the stock certificates, the plaintiff electe<l
damages for conversion and should, therefore, under all
applicable rules be held to the ordinary measure of damages in a conversion which is the value of the item converted at the time it is converted or within a reasonably
short period thereafter. Mr. Colman could have brought
an action for specific performance to require the defendant to return the stock certificates to him, but elected
not to do so.
rrhe prunary rules asserting a uwastn·e of
other than the vahw of the ::-;tock at the time of the conversion an· the New York rule and the Pennsylvania
rnle. The New York rule is

forth in :11 ALH

at

11agP 1:290 as follows:
"The best known of the
solutions is the so-called New York rule which providt·s
that damagPs are measnred hy t11P l1igh<'st JH'ict>
the stock reacht>s within a n•asonnlil<> ti11w afh•r
tJw vidim of tlJP ('011\'Pl'SiOll }pams of it. rrJ1P
tlMll'V is that h<• is entitlt-d to tiirn· to stud.'· tlw
and rnak(• up his wnd wht>tliPr or not to
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replace the stock and the converter must bear the
risk of loss caused hy higher prices during that
time."
'l1he Pennsylvania Rule is substantially to the following
pff rct and is found at page 1291 of the same artice as
follows:
''In Pennsylvania legislation was enacted providing that damages should be limited to the difference between the proceeds of conversion and
such higher value as the stock may have reached
within a reasonable time after notice of the conversion."
Colman found out about the conversion on approximately Jnly 1, 1968 (R 170). The sales occurred at
market. Hackett sold 100 shares on the 25th at $2.00 per
he sold 2,000 shares on the 25th at $2.00 per share;
and he sold 7,900 shares on June 27th at $2.00 per share
for a gross sale of $20,000.00 (R 170), and a net sale of
$19,4-17.00 (TI. 171). 'l11H)re is no clear cut evidence in the
J'(•eord as to the value of the stock at any other time
(•xrPvt a year latL'r on .June 2G, 1969, the figure cited by
Apprllant of $7.25 iwr share which the court should
n',j("et out of hand as being ineonsistent with any rules
of rPasonability as to the time following tlw transaction.
J f the conrt
to revnse, the measure of damages
:-;Jtould lw nH•rely the diffrrence between the sale price
ol' t11e stnd: of $19,447.00 and the amount netted by
('olrnnn. $1-.J.,000.00, or $5,447.00. Hmrever, this measure
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of damages flies in the face of the allegations in the plaintiff's complaint. The plaintiff's complaint state8 that the
stock was to be returned ten days after it was loaned, or
on January 2, 1968, and that it '''as converted as of that
date. The plaintiff shonld be hound hy his complaint in
that regard and the parties acknowledge that the stock
was selling for considerably less at the time than the net
amount recovered from Hackt>tt.

CONCLFS 1ON"

It is i·pspectfnlly Hubmitted that there is no liability
from the defendant to the plaintiff for the reason that
tlwre was no conversion by the def Pndant Anderson, or
if there was, that the defendant, Anderson, was a joint
tort feasor who has been rt-lrased by the relrase of
Hackett, and that thrre> is no liability 1mder the second
eanse of af'tion for the reason that tlw debt sned on
paid in full.

Y8 arnl
LO\VFJLL \'. SUM
B. MASON" of tlw firm of
SUl\L\IIDRHA YR, KLlN<l
& COi fNl<:
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Attorneys j'or TJefe11da11t-Zfrsr1nnde11t

27

I, Ned V{arnock, received two copies of the foregoing brief this ------------ day of-----------------------------··--····-,1972.

Ned ·warnock

